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Abstract
What modern game theorists describe as “fictitious play” is not the learning process
George W. Brown defined in his 1951 paper. Brown’s original version differs in a
subtle detail, namely the order of belief updating. In this note we revive Brown’s
original fictitious play process and demonstrate that this seemingly innocent detail
allows for an extremely simple and intuitive proof of convergence in an interesting
and large class of games: nondegenerate ordinal potential games.
Key words: Fictitious Play, Learning Process, Ordinal Potential Games
1 Introduction
Almost every modern textbook on game theory at least mentions the classical
learning process known as fictitious play or as the Brown-Robinson learning
process, introduced by Brown [4] as an algorithm for finding the value of a zero-
sum game, and first studied by Robinson [28]. Informal descriptions usually
depict two players playing a finite game repeatedly. After arbitrary initial
moves in the first round, in every round each player plays a myopic pure best
response against the empirical strategy distribution of his opponent. It was
once hoped that the players’ beliefs, i.e. their empirical strategy distributions,
always converge to the set of Nash equilibria in such a process.
While Robinson [28] showed this to hold for zero-sum games, and Miyazawa
[23] extended it to 2×2 games, Shapley [31] gave an example of a 3×3 game
where the beliefs do not converge. Since then a bulk of literature has tried to
identify classes of games where global convergence holds, including Milgrom
and Roberts [22], Krishna [17], Hofbauer [11], Monderer and Shapley [26,27],
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Hon-Snir et al. [14], Hahn [10], Sela [30], Cressman [6], and Berger [1]. Others
have found classes of games where fictitious play need not converge, e.g. Cowan
[5], Jordan [15], Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer [9], Monderer and Sela [24],
Foster and Young [7], or Krishna and Sjo¨stro¨m [19]. For overviews see Krishna
and Sjo¨stro¨m [18], Fudenberg and Levine [8], or Hofbauer and Sigmund [13].
All these authors employ the version of fictitious play informally described
above, where players update their beliefs simultaneously. 1 It is notable, how-
ever, that this is not the original version of Brown’s learning process. Brown
[4], routinely cited as the origin of fictitious play, clearly states that players
update alternatingly.
Indeed, fictitious play was “invented” two years earlier by Brown [3] in an
unpublished RAND report. In this report, he also defines his algorithm with
players updating their beliefs alternatingly, mentioning only briefly that a
minor variant (p. 4) of the process is to let players update simultaneously. To
distinguish these two versions of the process, I will speak of AFP and SFP
(for alternating fictitious play and simultaneous fictitious play), respectively.
AFP, the original version of fictitious play, seems to have gradually disap-
peared from the literature in the following decades. Robinson [28] refers to
Brown’s 1949 report; she starts with a description of SFP and then introduces
AFP as an alternate notion (p. 297) of the process. However, she makes clear
that her proofs and results hold for either version of fictitious play. While McK-
insey’s [21, Chapter 4] informal description of the process points to SFP, Luce
and Raiffa [20, Appendix A6.9] and Karlin [16, Chapter 6.5] exclusively de-
scribe Brown’s original version, AFP. Miyazawa’s [23] proof uses SFP again. A
few years later, Shapley [31] remarks that various conventions can be adopted
with regard to [. . . ] simultaneous vs. alternating moves (p. 24) and then goes
on working with SFP for simplicity (p. 25). Sze´p and Forgo´ [32, p. 128] give
a detailed description of AFP, but then switch to SFP in order to reproduce
Robinson’s proof. To my knowledge, all the later literature on fictitious play
works with SFP, and does not even mention the possibility of alternate up-
dating.
Indeed, SFP may be considered a simpler object of study than AFP, since
players are treated symmetrically under SFP, and this usually enhances an-
alytical convenience. However, as I show below, simultaneous updating may
also generate subtle problems which do not arise under AFP. In the following
I give a simple and intuitive proof of global convergence of AFP in nondegen-
erate ordinal potential games — a result which hitherto remains unproven for
SFP.
1 Some of them actually deal with continuous-time fictitious play, also first de-
scribed by Brown [3], but introduce this process via discrete-time fictitious play
with simultaneous updating.
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The intuition behind the result is straightforward. According to Monderer
and Sela’s [25] Improvement Principle, if a fictitious player switches to a new
strategy, this new strategy does better than his old one against the opponent’s
current strategy. The alternating-moves structure of AFP then implies that
an AFP process basically follows a better-response sequence of pure strategy
pairs. As is well known from Monderer and Shapley [27], if the game has
an ordinal potential, such a sequence cannot form a closed cycle. Hence it is
bound to terminate in a pure Nash equilibrium.
However, if the players move simultaneously, the resulting SFP process need
not follow a better-response sequence. The reason is that if both players switch
to a new strategy at the same time, the Improvement Principle only ensures
that each player’s new strategy is a better response to his opponent’s old
strategy, 2 which is not sufficient to continue the argument from above. Since
no counterexample is known either, global convergence for SFP in ordinal
potential games remains an open question.
2 Definitions
We start with the notation and some definitions:
Let (A,B) be an n×m bimatrix game, i.e. a finite two-player game, where
player 1, the row player, has pure strategies i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and player
2, the column player, has pure strategies j ∈M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}. A and B are
the n×m payoff matrices for players 1 and 2. If player 1 chooses i and player
2 chooses j, the payoffs to players 1 and 2 are aij and bij, respectively. The
sets of mixed strategies of player 1 and 2 are the probability simplices Sn and
Sm, respectively, and mixed strategies are written as column vectors. With a
little abuse of notation we will not distinguish between a pure strategy and
the corresponding mixed strategy representation as a unit vector.
Player 1’s expected payoff for playing i against player 2’s mixed strategy y
is (Ay)i. Analogously, (B
tx)j (where the superscript t denotes the transpose
of a matrix) is the expected payoff for player 2 playing j against the mixed
strategy x. If both players use mixed strategies x and y, respectively, the
expected payoffs are x·Ay to player 1 and y ·Btx to player 2, where the dot
denotes the scalar product of two vectors. We denote by BR1(.) and BR2(.)
the players’ pure strategy best response correspondences. A strategy profile
(x∗,y∗) is a Nash equilibrium if for all i, x∗i > 0 implies i ∈ BR1(y∗) and for
all j, y∗j > 0 implies j ∈ BR2(x∗). It is called a pure Nash equilibrium, if x∗
and y∗ are pure strategies.
2 For an easy example see the Discussion.
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2.1 Nondegenerate Games
It has been shown by Monderer and Sela [24] that even 2×2 games may exhibit
SFP processes with nonconvergent beliefs, if the game is degenerate. 3 Their
example also holds for AFP. Hence we must restrict ourselves to nondegenerate
games if we want to obtain convergence results.
Definition 1 We call a bimatrix game (A,B) degenerate, if for some i, i′ ∈
N , with i 6= i′, there exists j ∈ M with ai′j = aij, or if for some j, j′ ∈ M ,
with j 6= j′, there exists i ∈ N with bij′ = bij. Otherwise, the game is said to
be nondegenerate.
2.2 Potential Games
Monderer and Shapley [27] define several classes of games with a so-called
potential. The class of ordinal potential games is an important class of games.
It contains the class of weighted potential games, which include Rosenthal’s
[29] congestion games and have previously been called rescaled partnership
games by Hofbauer and Sigmund [12].
Definition 2 A bimatrix game (A,B) is an ordinal potential game, if there
exists an ordinal potential function, i.e., a function F : N×M → R, such that
for all i, i′ ∈ N and j, j′ ∈M ,
ai′j − aij > 0 ⇔ F (i′, j)− F (i, j) > 0,
and
bij′ − bij > 0 ⇔ F (i, j′)− F (i, j) > 0.
Definition 3 A bimatrix game (A,B) is a weighted potential game, if there
exist positive weights w1 and w2 and a function F : N×M → R, such that for
all i, i′ ∈ N and j, j′ ∈M ,
ai′j − aij = w1[F (i′, j)− F (i, j)]
and
bij′ − bij = w2[F (i, j′)− F (i, j)].
Clearly, a weighted potential game has an ordinal potential. Note that the
former imposes a cardinal condition on the payoffs, while the latter requires
only an ordinal condition. Hence the class of ordinal potential games is a
“large” class from a measure theoretic viewpoint, while the class of weighted
3 Miyazawa’s [23] proof relies on a particular tie-breaking rule.
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potential games is negligible. 4 For weighted potential games Monderer and
Shapley [27] proved global convergence of SFP to the equilibrium set. However,
for ordinal potential games no such result is known.
Monderer and Shapley [27] also define improvement paths and games with
the finite improvement property. We extend this definition by introducing im-
provement steps.
Definition 4 For a bimatrix game (A,B), define the following binary relation
on N×M : (i, j)→ (i′, j′) ⇔ (i = i′ and bij′ > bij) or (j = j′ and ai′j > aij).
If (i, j) → (i′, j′), we say that this is an improvement step. An improvement
path is a (finite or infinite) sequence of improvement steps (i1, j1)→ (i2, j2)→
(i3, j3)→ · · · in N×M . An improvement path (i1, j1)→ · · · → (ik, jk) is called
an improvement cycle, if (ik, jk) = (i1, j1). A bimatrix game is said to have
the finite improvement property (FIP), if every improvement path is finite,
i.e., if there are no improvement cycles.
It is clear that every nondegenerate game with an ordinal potential has the
FIP. Monderer and Shapley [27] show that also the opposite direction holds:
Lemma 5 A nondegenerate bimatrix game has the FIP if and only if it is an
ordinal potential game.
2.3 Fictitious Play
The following definition corresponds to Brown’s original version of fictitious
play, where players update alternatingly:
Definition 6 For the n×m bimatrix game (A,B), the sequence (it, jt)t∈N is
an alternating fictitious play process (AFP process), if i1 ∈ N and for all
t ∈ N,
it+1 ∈ BR1(y(t)) and jt ∈ BR2(x(t)),
where the beliefs x(t) and y(t) are given by
x(t) =
1
t
t∑
s=1
is and y(t) =
1
t
t∑
s=1
js. (1)
The definition of SFP differs from that of AFP only in the order of updating:
4 The set of n×m bimatrix games can be identified with the Euclidean space R2nm.
It can be shown that within this space, the set of ordinal potential games contains
an open set, while the set of weighted potential games is a null set (has Lebesgue–
measure zero), if n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 3.
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Definition 7 For the n×m bimatrix game (A,B), the sequence (it, jt)t∈N is
a simultaneous fictitious play process (SFP process), if (i1, j1) ∈ N×M and
for all t ∈ N,
it+1 ∈ BR1(y(t)) and jt+1 ∈ BR2(x(t)),
where x(t) and y(t) are given by (1) above.
If a fictitious play process (AFP or SFP) converges, it must be constant from
some stage on, implying that the limit is a pure Nash equilibrium. Even if the
process does not converge, it is easily established that if the beliefs converge,
then the limit must be a Nash equilibrium (which need not be pure, however).
Note that the beliefs can be updated recursively. The belief of a player in
round t+1 is a convex combination of his belief in round t and his opponent’s
move in round t+ 1:
x(t+ 1) =
t
t+ 1
x(t) +
1
t+ 1
it+1, (2)
y(t+ 1) =
t
t+ 1
y(t) +
1
t+ 1
jt+1. (3)
When a player plays some pure strategy at time t and some different pure
strategy at time t+ 1, we say that he switches at time t.
Definition 8 Let (i, j) = (it, jt) and (k, l) = (it+1, jt+1). We say that player
1 switches from i to k at time t, if i 6= k. Analogously, player 2 switches from
j to l at time t, if j 6= l.
3 The Result
Assume there is a switch from (i, j) to (k, l) at time t > 1, i.e. i 6= k or
j 6= l. Then i is a best response to y(t − 1) and k is a best response to y(t),
implying i·Ay(t − 1) − k ·Ay(t − 1) ≥ 0 and i·Ay(t) − k ·Ay(t) ≤ 0. Hence
(i−k)·Ay(t−1) ≥ 0 and (i−k)·Ay(t) ≤ 0. Left–multiplication with (3) shows
that we have (i−k)·Aj ≤ 0, which simply means aij ≤ akj. The same argument
applied to player 2 shows that bkj ≤ bkl. This simple observation is nothing
but the AFP analog of Monderer and Sela’s [25] Improvement Principle for
SFP. For nondegenerate games we can state it as follows.
Lemma 9 If an AFP process for a nondegenerate game contains a switch
from (i, j) to (k, l), then there is an improvement path from (i, j) to (k, l).
Proof. Given our observation above, this follows directly from the definitions
of nondegeneracy and improvement paths. 2
6
The main result is an immediate consequence of Lemma 9
Theorem 10 Let (A,B) be a nondegenerate ordinal potential game. Then
every AFP process converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume it does not. In a nonconvergent AFP process there are infinitely
many switches. Since there are only finitely many pure strategy pairs, however,
at least two such pairs are played infinitely often. Hence there must be a
sequence of switches leading from one of these pairs to the other and back
again. By Lemma 9, this means that there is an improvement cycle. By Lemma
5 then, the game cannot have an ordinal potential, which contradicts the
assumption. 2
Intuitively, in an AFP process in a nondegenerate game a switch from one
pure-strategy pair to another pure-strategy pair implies that there is an im-
provement path from the former to the latter. This improvement path con-
sists of one or two improvement steps, depending on whether only one player
switches, or both. Hence AFP processes essentially follow improvement paths
in nondegenerate games. If a game has the FIP, as nondegenerate ordinal po-
tential games do, then the process cannot involve cycles, and must terminate
in a pure Nash equilibrium.
4 Discussion
In nondegenerate ordinal potential games, AFP processes cannot cycle, be-
cause there are no improvement cycles. Why has this simple fact remained
unnoticed in all the studies of fictitious play? The obvious reason seems to be
that these studies work with SFP, and things are more difficult when players
update simultaneously. Indeed, if both players switch at the same time in an
SFP process, there need not be an improvement path from the old to the new
pure-strategy profile. To see this, imagine a 2×2 coordination game and two
SFP players starting from a pure-strategy profile where they miscoordinate.
In the second round they will again miscoordinate, since both switch to their
other strategy. Clearly, however, there is no improvement path connecting one
miscoordination profile to the other.
It is easy to extend our theorem to SFP processes where from some time on
the players never switch simultaneously. 5 The problem is to rule out processes
where players continue to do this infinitely often. An example of such a non-
convergent SFP process was constructed by Foster and Young [7]. This is not
5 It can also be shown that the theorem holds for a continuous-time fictitious play
process that does not involve mixed strategies, see Berger [2].
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a counterexample, however, since their game does not have an ordinal poten-
tial. While I conjecture Theorem 10 to hold for SFP generically, this question
remains open.
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